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IS THE ASSIGNEE OF A CONTRACT' LIABLE FOR THE
NON-PERFORMANCE OF DELEGATED DUTIES?
T is an oft recurring statement that "rights arising out of a con-
tract cannot be transferred if they are coupled with liabilities." 2
It is such obscure statements as this which give rise to and per-
petuate error, and an examination of the cases will show that this
one has been responsible for no little confusion in regard to the mat-
ter of assignment in the law of Contract. Our courts, under the pres-
sure of a well filled docket, are prone to seize upon a broad generali-
zation of this kind without examining its true meaning or defining
its proper limitations. It is high time for us to do away with such
archaic conceptions and to recognize what the modem business man
assumes, viz: that contract rights may be as freely transferred
as any other species of property. That much has already been ac-
complished is evident from a perusal of the recent literature on the
subject.? But there is more work to be done, for there are still sup-
posed rules of law which tend to defeat the reasonable expectations
of the parties and consequently to hamper the transfer of rights.
Such rules do not deserve to be perpetuated if there is any rational
basis for a contrary holding.
The recent case of Mound Valley Vitrified Brick Co. v. Mound
Valley Natural Gus and Oil Co. et al' illustrates what seems to be
an incorrect application of the so-called rule above quoted and
raises a questioh of considerable practical importance. A eutered
into a contract with B whereby he agreed to supply B with suffi-
cient natuiral gas for use in B's brick ki!ns for a r5 year period,
same to be paid for at a specified rate. Later the contract was as-
signed to C by A by a written agreement in which A did "sell, as-
sign and transfer" all his "right and title" to the contract to C. C
I The phrase "assignee of a contract" is obviously inaccurate, because it gives rise
to the inference that a contract is a single relation, whereas it is in fact a complex con-
ception involving numerous legal relations of different kinds, some of which are and
others of which are not assignable. The phrase has been used here because of its con-
venience and because it is a part of the generally accepted terminology. It would be more
correct to speak of the assignee of the rights, privileges, powers and immunities con-
ferred by a contract.
2POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS (3rd Am. Ed.) 594.
3 See "The Alienability of Choses in Action" by W. W. Cook, 29 HARv. L. REv.
816 and 1o Id.. 449, also "Is the Right of An Asignee of A Chose in Action Legal or
Equitable?" by Samuel Williston, 30 Id. 97.
' (1919). 258 Fed. 936.
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entered upon the performance of the agreement and fulfilled all its
terms for a period of more than four years after which 
he refused
to perform further. B thereupon brought a suit at law against 
A and
C jointly to recover in damages for breach of contract. It was 
held
by the court that A was liable but that C was not. on the ground
that "While contract rights may be assigned by one party 
to a con-
tract without the consent of another, contract obligations 
may not
be so assigned. In other words, where a personal contract 
involves
not only mutual rights of the parties thereto but also mutual 
obli-
gatioi;s. as in this case, both parties must consent to an assignment 
to
make it effective."
5
The case presents a situation which is likely to develop whenever
it is attempted to make an assignment in generaL terms 
of a con-
tract Ps such, and a careful analysis will show that there 
are in-
volved at least five separate and distinct questions, viz: 
(i) May
rights conferred by a contract, the enjoyment of which is 
dependent
upon the performance'of duties, be assigned? (2) May 
tfe assignot
assign duties imposed upon him by the contract, without 
the consent
of the other contracting party? (3) May the assignor delegate 
to
the assignee the performance of duties under the contract? (4)
Does an assignment in general terms, which purports to assign 
the
contract as such, embrace within itself a delegation of 
duties?
(5) Assuming that duties have been delegated, 
does the assignee
become liable either to the assignor or to the other contracting 
party
in case he fails to perform them?
It is submitted that each of these questions involves a separate
and distinct problem and that these problems canot all be 
solved
by the application of the convenient but misleading formula adopt-
ed by the court. An attempt will be made to reach a correct result
by the application of rational and well settled principles. 
As a
matter of fact it is the answer to only the last of these 
questions
that occasions any real difficulty in view of modem 
developmients
in the law of assignment.
That contract rights may be assigned even though their 
enjoy-
ment is dependent upon the performance of certain 
specified du-
ties is too well settled to admit of argument in spite 
of the in-
ference to the contrary inherent in the portion of the opinion 
quot-
ed supra.6
5 Ibid 943.
'This is true even though those duties are non-delegable. 
In Re ;Vtght, TS7 Fed.
544; Roduikeit v. Andrews, 74 Oh. St. 104; O'Keefe 
v. Allen, 2o R. I. 414; Kane v.
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In so far as the case holds that the assignor may not by an as-
signment free himself from liability under the contract, no fault
can be found with it. That the burdens of a contract cannot be
transferred without the consent of the obligee is fundamental. "You
have the right to the benefit you anticipate from the character,
credit and substance of the party with whom you contract."' , This
it is believed is all that is ordinarily intended or that can legitimate-
ly be intended by the statement quoted.8
That it does not mean that the assignor may not delegate the
performance of duties is evident from the fact that it is now gen-
erally admitted that the assignor may, in the absence of a clear
indication in the contract itself of a contrary intention, delegate
to the assignee the performance of duties unless the duties in question
are of such a nature as to make it clear that the parties must have
contemplated performance by the assignor personally.9
Whether the performance of the duties was delegated -to the as-
signee is a question of fact to be determined in each case from a
consideration of the nature of those duties, and from the acts of
the parties and the language used by them. There is nothing in the
case of the Mound Valley Vitrified Brick Co. v. The Mound Valley
Natural Gas & Oil Co., supra, to indicate that the duties involved
were of such a personal nature as to be non-delegable. Such an
assumption is expressly negatived by the fact that the other con-
tracting party was not only willing but anxious to have the assignee
perform them. That they were delegated seems a fair inference
from the fact that the assignee did perform them for a period of
more than four years. Moreover it has been held that an assignment
Clough, 36 Mich. 436. Such an assignment is not ineffectual although it purports toprovide for a substitution of the assignee in the matter of duty and liability as well as
of right. Am. L*th. Co. v. Ziegler (1914). 216 Mass. 287. To be sure the assignee takesthe rights subject to any defenses available against the assignor by reason of. the lat-ter's failure to perform conditions precedent or concurrent. Am. Lith. Co. v. Ziegler,
Locus cit.
T 
Humble v. Hunter, z2 Q. B. 310, 317.
4 See Atlantic & N. C. R. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., 147 N. C. 368, 38o;
Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Mfrs. fgo2], 2 K. B. 66o, 668-69.
JSee the authorities cited in the preceding note and Britil Wagon Co. v. Lea, L.
R.5 Q. B. D. 149; LaRue v. Groezinger, 84 Cal. 28X; Liberty Wall Paper Co. v. Stoner
170 N. Y. S82.
Tie confusion existing in regard to this whole matter is undoubtedly due in a largemeasure to the fact that the courts have not been careful in their choice of terminology.They have used the phrase "assignment of contract" to refer indiscriminately to situa-
tions that are fundamentally different. The phrase ought- to be discarded entirely. See
for an analysis of what the phrase connotes and for a discussion of the underlying prin-
ciples "Assignability of Contract" by F. C. Woodward. z8 Hsav. L. REV. 2:3.
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in general terms, such as this was, presumptively carries with it a
delegation of the duties upon the performance of which the enjoy-
ment of rights is dependent. 0 This presumption seems reasonable
in view of the quite evident understanding of the parties in the or-
dinary transaction of this kind.
The answer to the question as to whether or not the assignee is li-
able for the non-performance of delegated duties is not so clear and
requires a careful analysis of the operative fact of assignment and
its incidents. It may be admitted at the outset that an assignment
does not, except in the case of covenants running with the land, "
create privity either of estate or contract between the assignee and
the other contracting party in the sense in which this chameleon-like
term is generally used in the law." But the conclusion that he is
not liable does not, as is sometimes erroneously assumed,1 2 follow
inevitably from this admission, for there are at least two classes of
cases in which many courts recognize and enforce rights in favor
of one who is not privy to the contract. This is true (i) in the
case of the assignee of rights under a contract, 2 and (2) in the
case of a third party beneficiary.A If therefore it should appear
that the acceptance of an assignment in general terms, which em-
braces a delegation of duties as well as a transfer of rights, imports
a promise on sufficient consideration made by the assignee to the
assignor whereby the former assumes to perform delegated du-
ties, and that this promise is one "for the benefit of" the other party
to the contract assigned, then the latter's right to enforce the prom-
ise would seem to be clear, at least in those jurisdictions in which
a creditor-beneficiary is given a right of action.
There can never be any question as to the sufficiency of the con-
sideration in the normal case where the assignment is not gratuitous
and rights are conferrred upon the assignee thereby. As to wheth-
er the asignee does make such an assumption is, of course, a
IgPloxeer Loan and Land Co. v. Cowden, x28 Minn. 307.
See also Grnbl ng v. Boka, a6 Cal. App. 77r.
MaThis statement requires explanation. It is not the assignment of the contractual
rights and duties that creates the privity of estate here but rather the assignment, or more
properly, the conveyance of the estate in the land, to which the contractual rights and
duties are incident, that creates the privity.
"For an interesting comment on the use of this term Gee is Am. L. REV. 244-4S.
z See, e. g., the superficial reasoning indulged in to prove the point in a R. L. 626.
1m See Tolhurit v. Associoted Portland Cement Mfrs. E[goz, 2 K. B. 66o at 668.
32 See cases on this matter together with the underlying principles discussed in 27
YAL LAw JoueNAL zooS; is HAv. L, REV. 767.
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question to be determined by an interpretation of the contract
incident to the assignment. We may put aside for the present
those cases in which the parties expressly stipulate that the assignee
shall assume the burdens. In such a case the assignee is ob-
viously liable to the assignor for the non-fulfillment of his prom-
ise. As to whether he is also liable to the other party to the con-
tract assigned depends upon whether his promise is one "for the
benefit of" the latter, a question which we will consider presently.
The cases which cause the most difficulty are the numerous ones in
which the assignment is in the general terms-"thd assignor does
hereby sell, assign and transfer all his right and title to the within
contract." It is submitted that the acceptance of an assignment in
this form does presumptively import a tacit promise on the part of
the assignee to assume the burdens of the contract, and that this
presumption should prevail in the absence of the clear showing of
a contrary intention. The presumption seems reasonable in view
of the evident expectation of the parties. The assignment on its
face indicates an intent to do more than simply to transfer the
benefits assured by the contract. It purports to transfer the con-
tract as a whole, and since the contract is made up of both benefits
and burdens both must be intended to be included. It is true the
assignor has power only to delegate and not to transfer the per-
formance of duties as against the other party to the contract as-
signed, but this does not prevent the assignor and the assignee from
shifting the burden of performanqe as between themselves. More-
over common sense tells us that the assignor, after making such an
assignment, usually regards himself as no longer a party to the
contract. He does not and, from the nature of things, cannot
easily keep in touch with what is being done in order properly to
protect his interests if he alone is to be liable for non-performance.
Not infrequently the assignor makes an assignment because he is
unable to perform further or because he intends to disable himself
for further performance." The assignee on the other hand under-
stands that he is to carry out the terms of the contract, as is shown
by the fact that he usually does, most of the decided cases being
those in which the other party objected to performance by the as-
signee. In view of these considerations is it not reasonable to in-
fer that the assignee tacitly promises to perform? It is no answer
to say that the assignor should take an express promise-a thing
'" See Tolhurst v. Associa ed Portland Cement Mrx. [,9o3", A. C. 414.
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which he probably would do were he familiar with the law on the
subject. Moreover the implication of such a promise is not incon-
t-istent with existing rules of law. In making it we are simply in-
terpreting what the parties mean by their acts and the language
used. That there is such a tacit promise has been affirmed in a few
instances in which the assignor was permitted to recover for dam-
ages suffered by reason of the assignee's failure to perform del-
egated duties."a
The liability in such a case has sometimes apparently been re-
garded as quasi-contractual1e This is clearly en oneous. A prom-
ise inferred from the voluntary acts of a person may be as truly
contractual as one expressed in so many words.
If this argument is sound, what is to prevent the other contract-
ing party, as a creditor-beneficiary, from suing the assignee on his
promise? It is true that the performance of the promise will ben-
efit both the assignor and the other party to the contract assigned.
But one need not be a sole beneficiary to have an enforcible right.
Where the promisor has made a promise, the fulfillment of which
necessarily requires him to do something directly for a third per-
sun, as is the case here, the latter is usually regarded as a benefic-
iary within the rule, even though the promisee is also and perhaps
primarily intended to be benefited thereby. 7  That the assignee
is liable at the suit of the third party where he expressly assumes
and promises to perform delegated duties has already been decided
in a few cases.'" If an express promise will support an action, it
is difficult to see why a tacit promise should not have the same
" Corvallis & A. R..R. Co. v. Portland E. & E. Ry Co. (19s7), 84 Or. S24.
See also Cutting Packing Co. v. Packer's Exch., 86 Cal. 574. (The authority of
this case is somewhat weakened by the fact that the decision is based partly on a stat-
ute.)
Atlantic & N. C. R. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., r47 N. C. 368;
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Douglas County Bank, 42 Nebr. 469.
I See Atlantic & N. C. R. . Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., cited in preceding note.
This has probably resulted from the confusion in the use of the term "implied
contract" which is employed indiscriminately by the courts to refer to both kinds of
obligations.
"Lawrence v. For (18.19), 2o N. Y. 268:
Ballard v. Home Nat'l Bank, 9i Kans. gi.
See also numerous cases collected is H v. L. Rv. 8oS N. II and II.
28 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. The Chicago & Alton, 73 Mo. 389; Back v. Boston etc. Min-
ing Co., 16 Mont. 467; Younse v. Broad Road,Lbr. CO., 148 N. C. 34.
Contra: Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Dancel, ri Fed. 692:
Turner v. McCarty, z2 Mich. 264. The Federal courts apparently deny the right
of a creditor-beneficiary in any case. See National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 223.
The same has heretofore been true i., Michigan. But see z8 Micu. L. Rzv. S8.
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effect.19 The assignor and the assignee could not, of course, be
joined in a suit at law under the generally prevailing procedure, as
was attempted in Mound Valley Vitrified Brick Co. v. Mound Val-
ley Natural Gas & Oil Co..' inasmuch as the liability of each
arises on a separate and distinct contract.
The hardship that is likely to result from the contrary holding is
well illustrated by the case of Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Ce-
ment Mfrs.,21 in which A agreed to supply chalk to B Co. for
use in its cement works for a period of 5o years at a specified price
per ton. B Co. later assigned to C Co. and went out of business,
distributing all its assets so that it remained in existence in name
only. The court, at the suit of the assignee, held the assignment
effectual; Collins, M. R. saying "There is certainly an apparent
hardship, unless he accepts the-new company instead of the 
old,
that whereas before the assignment he had a solvent company 
to
deal with against whom he had an effectual remedy if they 
refused
to perform the contract, now, if the price of chalk were to fall 
below
Is, 3d., and the new company no longer cared to take 
it at that price.
his only remedy would be against a company wholly denuded 
of
assets.''22 This is, to say-the least, a startling proposition and 
in-
volves a risk which the other party to the contract assigned 
ought
not in justice to be compelled to assume. Ought a court not to 
say,
what was said in the case of Wightman v. Spoffor,
23 that "When
Spofford accepted the contract, as assignee, and became clothed
with all the rights conferred by it, he assumed all the obligations 
of
his assignor. He could not hold plaintiff -to the terms of the 
con-
tract and stand himself discharged from it. This conclusion 
is
based upon the plainest principles of equity. Familiar principles 
of
law impose on him, upon accepting the assignment and taking 
the
place of Townsend. the obligation to perform Townsend's covenants
and render him liable for failure to perform them."
It must, however, be admitted that the current of the authorities
1S The contrary holding in Lisenby v. Neeiton, tzo Cal. 571, seems 
to be based upon
the interpretation of a statute.
3*Locus cit. supra note 4.
21 [9021. 2. K. B. 660.
SIbid 674.
s6 Iowa 145, 148. In this case the assignee of a bond conditioned upon the con-
veyance of certain land on payment of the agreed price was held liable 
in equity at the
suit of the vendor for non-payment of the stipulated installments of the purchase 
price.
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is opposed to the view here advocated, '4 but it is believed by the
writer that this has resulted from a misapprehension of the prob-
lem involved, and from a failure to discriminate between cases that
resemble each other but are essentially different.
The liability of the assignee has frequently been denied in cases
involving an assignment by one of the parties to a contract for the
purchase of land. In some of these cases the decision is rested upon
the narrow ground of want of privity.
25 This is perhaps not to be
wondered at in view of the fact that our real property law has al-
ways been encumbered with nice distinctions in regard to privity.
It is not strange, therefore, that the legal mind should find it diffi-
cult to break away from adherence to this fetish when a contract
relating to land is at stake, and should try to solve every problem in
connection with it by an application of the rules relating to cove-
nants running with the land. But it is one thing to say that privity
of estate is essential to create liability when one takes a conveyance
of land which was subject to contractual burdens in the hands of
the grantor, of which the grantee probably had no actual knowl-
edge, and a quite different thing to apply the same line of reasoning
to a case where one takes an assignment of a contract knowing that
it embraces both rights and duties. The two cases are very differ-
ent, for the grantor of land does not, in the ordinary case at least,
as does the assignor of a contract, purport to transfer any contrac-
tual rights or duties, but simply to alien a certain estate in the
land which estate is made up of rights and duties in rem. There is
therefore no reason for saying that the grantee by accepting the
conveyance promises to assume the contractual relations entered
into by prior holders of that estate.
in other cases the assignee's immunity has been placed upon the
ground that his position is analogous to that of the grantee of land
who takes it subject to a mortgage but does not expressly assume
to pay the mortgage.21 However, as is said in Wightman v. Spof-
14 The statement in z8 HRmv. L. RsV. 28 that "the asignment is a distinct benefit
to the seller. for by its operation he acquires a right of action against the assignee," un-
fortunately does not seem to he supported by the authorities. The cases there cited are
those in which the assignee expressly promised to perform delegated duties.
21Southern Pac. Co. v. Butterfield (x9x6), 39 Nev. 177; Cote v. Olson (Sask. 1912),
a . L. R. 39- (semble).
See also Midland County Satings Bank v. T. C. Prouty Co., 158 Mich. 6S6.
= Fisher v. Brown. 24 NV. Va. 713; Lavelle v. Gordon, iS Mont. ss: Hammer v.
1rolson, 44 Ill. 19a.
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lord,2 7 the analogy is not at all perfect. The same dissiumilarity
exists here that was pointed out above, viz. the grantor of land sub-
ject to a mortgage does not purport to assign the mortgage but sim-
ply to transfer his estate in the land. Moreover it seems that even
the grantee in such a case may be liable for non-payment of the
mortgage debt witi'out an express assumption if the circumstances
are such as to show a tacit promise to pay--e. g., where he keeps
back part of the consideration for that purpose. 5-
To be sure the assignee ought not to be held liable tor the non-
performance of duties where it clearly appears that he did not as-
sume the burdens of the contract. It is obvious that there may be
merely an assignment of rights, the intention being that the assign-
or shall alone continse liable to perform the duties. Of this kind
is the case of Tolerton & Stetson Co. v. Anglo-California Bank,;
29
in which the seller of a car of canned goods, who -had warranted
them, consigned the goods to the defendant bank and scat the bill
of lading with draft attached to the defendant. Plaintiff paid the
draft- and accepted the goods but later, upon learning that the war-
ranty had not been fulfilled, brought suit against the bank for
breach of it, on the theory that the bank was an assignee of the con-
tract of sale and therefore became liable on the warranty. The
court held quite properly that no such liability had been incurred
by the bank.3 0  There had been no assignment in general terms
of the contract as such, and as the court points out, there was clear-
ly no intention to assume the duty to fulfill the warranty. "What
was in fact done by the assignment of the draft and bill of lading,
was to transfer to the bank the canneries company's right- to the
price, and to give it the possession of the goods as security." In so
far as the cases of Finch v. Gregg"' and Landa v. Lattin Bros.,
2
which appear to be on all fours with the foregoing case, announce
a contrary rule, they must be disapproved as the holdings are not con-
sistent with the facts involved.
2? S6 Iowa 14S.
1 T ichell v. Mears, 8 Biss. 211: ComStock v. Hit;, 37 Ill. 542 (semble).
2 112 Iowa 706. See also Gammel Book Co. v. Paine, 75 Nebr. 683.
"It is to be noted that the suit in this case was brought for breach of warranty. It
is of course obvious that the bank was not entitled to collect more, in the first instance,
than the seller himself could have collected. Whether it was liable to the buyer on the
quasi-contractual ground that it had received money which it could not equitably retain
is a question outside the scope of this article.
1 x26 N. C. 176.
U ig Tex. Civ. App. 246.
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The assignee's liability has also frequetly been in issue in cases
involving the assignment of leases. The problem is rendered more
difficult of solution here by reason of the fact that the word,
"lease," is a word of no precise connotation. In its primary signi-
fication it denotes the conveyance of an estate in land, :j and in this
sense it has very little in common with the term contract. it is
"also used in a more extended sense to describe not onil the legal
act (the conveyance) by which a lesser estate is vested in another,
but, in addition, the legal act or acts by which various contractual
obligations are created in connection with such conveyance "2 ' 4 and
in this sense we may speak of it as a contract. " , The phrase, "as-
signment of a lease," may therefore refer to ether one of two
things. (i) It may mean simply the transfer of the estate, or
rights and duties in rem of the-lessee; or (2) it may refer to What
purports to be a transfer of the estate of the lessee plus the con-
tractual rights and duties entered into and existing as incident to
the estate. Where the lessee makes an assignment in the sense
first indicated, it is clear that there is no ground for saying that the
asignee by accepting the assignment assumes the contractual bur-
dens incident to the estate, except in so far as the law imposes lia-
bility upon him because of the privity of estate, for the reason that
an assignment in this form does not purport to transfer any rights
or duties in personam. It purports to transfer simply rights and
duties in rem, and, perhaps, to create new rights and duties in per-
sonata between the assignor and the assignee. This seems to be the
situation where the so-called assignment is in form a sub-lease.3 6
But where the lessee does more than simply to transfer his estate,
by purporting to transfer a "lease," using that term in its more ex-
tended sense as including the contractual rights and duties inci-
2 LACKSTOAN5' COMM. .117.
4 z TIiFFANY. LANDLORD AND TENANT i59-6o.
mCf. Aus-iN's JUiISpRUDEncE (sth ed.) .176 where it is said: "Rights in rem
sometimes arise from an instrument which is called a contract, and are therefore said
to arise from a contract: the instrument in these cases wears a double aspect, or has
a two-fold effect: to one purpose it live- itis in personam anti is a contract, to another
purpose it gives jus in rem and is a conveyance. When a so-called contract passei an
estate, or. in the language of the modern Civilians, a right in rem, to the oblgor, it is
to that extent not a contract but a conveyance; although it may be a contract to some
other extent and considered from some other aspect."
14The transfer of a tenant's entire interest even though in form a sub-lease is
generally regarded as an assignment.
Craig v. Summers, 47 Minn. z8g; St. Joseph & St. L. R. R. Co. v. St. L., L M.
& S. Ry. Co., z35 Mo. 173; Mulligan v. Hollingsworth, 99 Fed. 2x6.
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dent to the estate,3 7 then we Have the same question that arises in
any case where the assignor attempts to transfer a contract as
such.. In such a case it seems not unreasonable to say that the as-
signee, in accepting the assignment, does tacitly promise to per-
form the obligations of the contract.
Since the assignee of a lease is in all cases liable because of priv-
ity of estate on all covenants and promises which run with the land,
the question becomes acute only, (I) in the case of so-called per-
sonal covenants which do not "touch and concern the thing de-
mised" and consequently do not run with the land, and (2) in case
there have been successive assignments, and an attempt is made
to bold an assignee liable for breaches occurring after he has re-
assigned and thereby destroyed the privity of estate neces-
sary to create liability based on the doctrine of covenants running
with the land. No extended examination of the cases will be at-
tempted, since the courts, without stopping to consider the nature
or purport of the assignment, have held, quite uniformly, that the
assignee is not liable in either one of these cases in the absence of
an express assumption of liability. 8 This is not strange in view of
the fact that the law relating to leases was definitely settled long be-
fore the advent of the doctrine giving a third party be-.eficiary a
rig-ht of action. It would perhaps not be wise for the courts them-
selves to change such a well settled rule of law. but it is a strange
rule that enables one to escape a just liability by shifting the burden
to an insolvent.
3 9
A, due recognition of the fact that the assignee does, in such a
case, tacitly promise to perform the covenants of the lease would
make unnecessary such an anomalous decision as that in Mann v.
Ferdinand Munch Brewery"0 where the court had to do violence to
the fundamental principles of contract law to find a basis for hold-
ing the dispossessed assignee liable on the cbvenants of the lease.
21 It is submitted that this is what is ordinarily intended where the assignment is
in this form: "the lessee does hereby sell. assign and transfer the within lease."
I TIFPANY, LANDLORD AnD TzNANT 987 n.
Sie fohnson v. Sherman, IS Cal. 287; Goss v. Woodland Fire Brick Co., 4 Pa. Sup.
Ct T67.
"22.q N. Y. x8g: noted in z7 MicH. L. REv. gzz In this case the assignee was
held liable on the ground that he had made an express contract with the landlord to
assume the covenants of the lease in consideration of the latter's consenting to the as-
signment, although the only evidence of such a contract was a letter written by the assig-
nee to the landlord nine months after the assignment and assent thereto, in which he said,
"we will * * * assume the lease." There was no evidence of any intent to contract
with the landlord, and, even if that difficulty were eliminated, there still remains the ob-
jection that the alleged consideration for the promise was a past consideration.
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No objection can be urged to a rule holding the assignee liable
to the other party to the contract assigned, for non-performance
of duties, where it is celar that there has been a tacit assumption of
liability, that could not be made with equal ferce in any case in
which a creditory-beneficiary claims a right of action. It is believed
that the doctrine giving him a direct right of action, where there
has been an express assumption of liability, has become well enough
established and has demonstrated its usefulness to such a degree
as to warrant its extension to cover this situation.
GROVER C. GRISMORE.
University of Michigan Law School.
